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Work Assignment 3: Risk Assessment and Gap Analysis
Global Geodesy Supply Chain — Robust Supply Chain Programme
Prepared for: United Nations Global Geodetic Centre of Excellence (UN-GGCE) Prepared by: Ben Wortley, Lead Consultant — UN-GGCE ToR2 Version: 2.5.0 Date: 22 July 2026 Status: Draft for Review Reference: WA3, Terms of Reference 2 Supersedes: Version 2.4.0 (23 July 2026)
Audience
This report serves two readerships: (1) UN-GGCE leadership and technical counterparts already familiar with this engagement; and (2) UN-GGCE staff and Member State stakeholders new to this specific analysis. Readers new to the engagement should read this Purpose and Reading Guide; the sections that follow provide the full technical detail underlying its conclusions.
Purpose and Reading Guide
This report is Work Assignment 3 of the UN-GGCE Global Geodesy Supply Chain Assessment (Terms of Reference 2). Work Assignment 2 mapped how the five critical geodetic products are produced; this report assesses what can go wrong — where the production chains are structurally fragile, what has already gone wrong in the recent historical record, and which gaps should be addressed first.
The quantitative foundation of this assessment is the State of Geodesy 2026: A baseline maturity assessment (UN-GGCE, 16 March 2026)[^sog2026] — the first comprehensive maturity assessment of the global geodesy supply chain. That report established, through consultation with more than 130 experts, the published capability maturity baseline on which every PPTD (People, Process, Technology, Data) score in this document rests; this report carries that baseline forward into risk classification and gap analysis.
Companion Documents
Readers new to the engagement should start with three companion documents: the tier and data-level structure is defined in the EGV Data Levels and Supply Chain Tiers appendix (Work Assignment 1 Appendix); the risk scoring framework (including a key terms glossary) is explained in the Critical Product Mapping Report (Work Assignment 2); and the six Guiding Principles cited throughout are established in the Guiding Principles document (Work Assignment 1). All numeric scores in this report are produced by the Investment Prioritization and Risk Rubric (Work Assignment 1b) and are traceable to the UN-GGCE knowledge graph.
Executive Summary
The global geodesy supply chain is the invisible foundation of the modern world. Every satellite navigation signal, every Earth observation product, every precision orbit determination, and every timing synchronisation used across aviation, maritime transport, financial infrastructure, energy grids, and emergency response depends on a continuous chain of ground observations, analysis, and product delivery that most stakeholders are entirely unaware of.
This report provides a risk assessment and gap analysis of the five critical geodetic product domains identified in Work Assignment 2: Satellite Orbits (GNSS), the International Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF), Earth Orientation Parameters (EOP), the International Celestial Reference Frame (ICRF), and the Global Gravity Model. The assessment draws on the capability maturity baseline published in the State of Geodesy 2026[^sog2026] and the tier risk scores of the UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment (2026), supplemented by verified external documentation spanning January 2021 to May 2026.
The single highest-confirmed risk in the entire supply chain is the Analysis Center Coordinator (ACC) and SPOCC combination engine within the Satellite Orbits workflow. This tier carries a Tier Risk Score of 18.25 out of a maximum possible 25.00 — the highest of all 25 assessed tiers, classified High under the operational scoring track — and has been empirically validated as a single point of failure by historical U.S. government shutdown events in 2013 and 2018–2019. It is also the only tier in the assessment with governance gaps against all four governance-track principles simultaneously, which under the rubric elevates a High operational score to urgent. No alternative combination pathway exists for the IGS Final Orbit product. This finding must be the primary investment target of any near-term intervention programme.
Beyond this acute single point of failure, the findings are structurally sobering. A systemic pattern of Network Operations Technology sub-scores of 1.0 — appearing independently across the Satellite Orbits, ITRF, EOP, and ICRF workflows — indicates that the archiving and correlation tier is the most widespread capability deficit in the supply chain. Governance and financing capabilities are uniformly scored at 1.00, the minimum observed value, confirming a structural absence of coordinated oversight rather than individual institutional failure.
Annual global funding for the entire supply chain is estimated at €60–90 million — less than 0.05% of the revenue generated by dependent services. A single large-scale geomagnetic storm, a handful of key station closures, or a sustained escalation of GNSS jamming and spoofing could degrade products underpinning billions of euros of daily economic activity, with no coordinated institutional mechanism capable of responding. Specific remediation priorities are identified for each product domain and the supply chain as a whole.
1. Introduction and Methodology
1.1 Scope
This report constitutes Work Assignment 3 of the Robust Global Geodetic Supply Chain Programme, building directly on the product dependency maps produced in Work Assignment 2 and evaluated against the architectural principles established in Work Assignment 1 v2.1 (Blueprint for a Robust Global Geodetic Supply Chain). Its purpose is to assess what can go wrong, what has gone wrong in the recent historical record, and where the supply chain is structurally incomplete across five Essential Geodetic Variable (EGV) domains.
The assessment covers events from January 2021 to May 2026. This window was chosen because it captures three transformative events: Russia's invasion of Ukraine (February 2022), which restructured the geopolitical risk landscape for geodesy permanently; the establishment of the UN-GGCE (March 2023), which for the first time gave the global geodetic community an institutional home within the United Nations; and the onset of DOGE-driven federal budget restructuring in the United States (early 2025), which introduced significant uncertainty into the largest single national contributor to the supply chain.
1.2 Risk Scoring Model
All quantitative risk scores cited in this report are produced by the two-track Investment Prioritization and Risk Rubric (Work Assignment 1b, v3.1). The authoritative scoring run is dated 22 June 2026; all 25 tier scores have been calculated and stored in a database maintained for this engagement, and every score table in this report is drawn from that database.
Operational track (numeric):
Tier Risk Score = PPTD Gap × Step Criticality
Where:
- PPTD Gap is the average unmet capability maturity across the People, Process, Technology, and Data dimensions for the capabilities mapped to that workflow tier. Derived from the maturity scores published in the State of Geodesy 2026[^sog2026] (58 capabilities, verified 15 June 2026 against the published report). Gap = (5.0 − average PPTD score), computed as a straight unweighted average across all four dimensions.
- Step Criticality is an integer from 1 to 5 representing the structural importance of that tier in the product delivery chain: 1 = informational step with alternatives available; 5 = no substitute pathway exists, failure terminates product delivery.
The resulting score ranges from 0 to 25. Classification thresholds are defined in §5.2.
Governance track (qualitative): each tier is separately assessed for gaps against Principle 2 (political concentration), Principle 3 (absence of a governing agreement or mandate), Principle 4 (proprietary critical-path software or restricted data), and Principle 6 (absence of independent monitoring). Governance findings do not modify the numeric score; they are reported alongside it and elevate investment urgency. A High operational score combined with Principle 2 or Principle 3 gaps at a critical-path function is treated as urgent.
Where a score does not yet exist in the assessment record, capabilities are marked [not yet assessed].
1.3 Data Sources and Provenance
This report draws on three classes of evidence:
State of Geodesy 2026: A baseline maturity assessment (UN-GGCE, 16 March 2026)[^sog2026] — the authoritative published baseline of 58 capability maturity scores covering the five EGV product domains. The scores were produced using the People, Process, Technology, Data (PPTD) capability maturity framework developed during the first UN-GGCE consultancy engagement (Terms of Reference 1). The 25 workflow tier risk scores are computed by this engagement from that baseline, and both sets of scores have been calculated and stored in a database maintained for this engagement. Capability maturity scores are cited throughout this document with the attribution (State of Geodesy 2026).
Work Assignment 2 Annexes (Workflow Description Documents) — the five narrative workflow descriptions produced in Work Assignment 2, one per critical geodetic product. These documents define the tier structure that the risk scoring model operates on.
Verified External Documentation — peer-reviewed publications, UN-GGCE reports, space agency technical documents, EASA safety bulletins, and national geodetic agency publications. All external sources are cited as numbered footnotes in the house style of the State of Geodesy 2026, with full URLs, and are consolidated in Appendix C. No source without a verifiable primary URL has been used. The CNN citation present in an earlier internal draft of this report has been removed and replaced with the primary GPSPATRON analysis that serves as the principal verified source for the June 2025 Persian Gulf interference event.
2. Supply Chain Architecture Overview
The global geodesy supply chain produces five families of geodetic products — Satellite Orbits, the International Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF), Earth Orientation Parameters (EOP), the International Celestial Reference Frame (ICRF), and the Global Gravity Model — through a set of interconnected observation, analysis, combination, and distribution tiers. These tiers are documented in the WA2 workflow descriptions.
The supply chain exhibits four structural properties that amplify every individual risk identified in this report:
Systemic underfunding. The UN-GGCE Hidden Risk Report (June 2024) established that the entire global geodesy supply chain operates on annual funding of approximately €60–90 million — less than 0.05% of the revenue generated by dependent GNSS and Earth observation services.[^hidden-risk] The supply chain has no financial resilience: no redundant analysis centres on standby, no reserve stations for deployment, no funded succession mechanism.
Governance vacuum. The supply chain has no international governance body with authority, mandate, or resources to act as a system-level custodian. The UN-GGCE, established March 2023, is a necessary and welcome development, but is not yet that body. The supply chain's mandate, policy formulation, strategic planning, and risk management capabilities are each scored at 1.00 in the State of Geodesy 2026 — the minimum observed value.[^sog2026]
Best-effort contributions. Data collection from ground station observatories, quality checking, analysis, and product development is conducted on a best-effort, in-kind contribution model with no binding SLAs or MOUs. The UN-GGCE has documented this explicitly.[^sog2026] This model does not provide the accountability or resilience required by WA1 Principles 2 and 3.
Active geopolitical attack. For the first time in the supply chain's history, GNSS signals that constitute a primary input to orbit determination and EOP processing are under active, documented, state-acknowledged attack. The scale and geographic extent of GNSS jamming and spoofing operations since February 2022 represents a qualitative change in the threat environment.
3. Risk Assessment by Product Domain
Risk scores for each tier in each product domain are drawn from the UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment (2026). Classification thresholds: Critical (≥ 20), High (13–19.99), Significant (7–12.99), Minor (0–6.99).
3.1 Satellite Orbits (GNSS)
Workflow Reference: Satellite Orbits Workflow (Work Assignment 2 Annex, v5.5)
Overall domain classification: HIGH — Tier 3 carries the highest score of all 25 assessed tiers
| Tier | Description | PPTD Gap | Step Criticality | Tier Risk Score | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 0 | GNSS Observation Network | 2.67 | 3 | 8.00 | Significant |
| Tier 1 | Data Archiving (GDCs, CDDIS, IGS Datacenter) | 2.70 | 4 | 10.80 | Significant |
| Tier 2 | Analysis Centres (JPL, GFZ, ESA, CODE, NRCan, WHU, MIT, TUG, AIUB) | 2.67 | 3 | 8.00 | Significant |
| Tier 3 | ACC + SPOCC Combination Engine | 3.65 | 5 | 18.25 | High |
| Tier 4 | Product Distribution (IGS FTP, RINEX, IONEX) | 2.33 | 2 | 4.67 | Minor |
(UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment, 2026)
Critical Bottleneck — ACC/SPOCC Combination Engine (Tier 3, Score 18.25 / High).
The Analysis Center Coordinator (ACC) function and the SPOCC (Software for the Processing and Combination of Orbits) combination engine constitute the single highest-confirmed supply chain risk in this entire engagement. This is not an inferred risk; it is an empirically validated single point of failure. The ACC/SPOCC combination pipeline is the unique production pathway for the IGS Final Combined Orbit and Clock product. No alternative combination pathway exists. There is no geographically or institutionally redundant backup.
This vulnerability has been activated twice by U.S. government shutdowns: in October 2013 (16-day shutdown) and in December 2018–January 2019 (35-day shutdown, the longest in U.S. government history). In both cases, NASA (which co-hosts the IGS Central Bureau at JPL and GSFC) was directly affected. During the 2018–2019 shutdown, IGS operations were disrupted, demonstrating that the best-effort voluntary model provides no protection when the host agency is legally unable to operate.[^igsmail-igs2018] This is precisely the process and governance failure that a Step Criticality of 5 is designed to capture.
The PPTD Gap for Tier 3 (3.65) is the highest of any tier across all five product domains, reflecting the concentration of critical process and governance deficits at this chokepoint. The Tier Risk Score of 18.25 sits deep in the High classification band (13–19.99) and leads the cross-domain ranking by a clear margin — the next-ranked tier scores 15.00. On the governance track, this is the only tier in the assessment with gaps against all four governance-track principles simultaneously (Principles 2, 3, 4, and 6); under the rubric, governance findings of this severity elevate a High operational score to urgent regardless of its numeric distance from the Critical band.
WA1 principle gaps: Principle 2 (Political Resilience — no single political jurisdiction shall have sole control over critical functions); Principle 3 (Centralised Accountability — operation on a best-effort model without formal SLA); Principle 4 (SPOCC proprietary software with no community implementation); Principle 6 (no independent monitoring of the combination function).
Intervention: Establish a formally governed, institutionally diverse, geographically distributed backup ACC/SPOCC capability in a jurisdiction outside the United States, with a tested failover protocol exercised no less than annually.
GNSS Signal Integrity — Active Threat Environment.
Running in parallel with the structural single point of failure at Tier 3 is the documented, sustained, and escalating degradation of the GNSS signal environment. This threat affects Tier 0 of the Satellite Orbits workflow and propagates through to EOP, ITRF, and ICRF workflows that depend on GNSS-derived observations.
Event ORB-2022-01 (2022-02-24): Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggered sustained GNSS jamming and spoofing operations. EASA issued Safety Information Bulletin SIB 2022-02 (subsequently revised three times). IATA documented a 220% increase in GPS signal loss events affecting aircraft between 2021 and 2024. Jamming documented in Baltic, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and Arctic.[^easa-iata]
Event ORB-2024-01 (2024-03-23): GPS jamming from Russia's Kaliningrad exclave affected more than 1,600 aircraft over Eastern Europe in two days — one of the largest single GPS disruption events affecting civil aviation on record, traced to Kaliningrad by GPSJAM.org ADS-B analysis.[^gpsworld-jam]
Event ORB-2024-02 (2024-04-01): 117 ships simultaneously appeared via AIS at Beirut Airport due to GNSS spoofing in the Eastern Mediterranean — the largest single maritime spoofing event recorded at that time.[^gpspatron]
Event ORB-2024-04 (2024-12-25): Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 crash-landed in Kazakhstan. GNSS spoofing has been cited as a possible contributing factor, with formal accident investigation findings pending. This event marks the point at which GNSS interference transitioned from operational nuisance to potential cause of fatal safety consequences.[^iata-avregwatch]
Event ORB-2025-01 (2025-06-01): Over 3,000 vessels disrupted in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz within less than two weeks — the largest single maritime GNSS disruption event on record. Linked to Iran–Israel conflict escalation and regional electronic warfare operations. Red Sea and Gulf of Aden also affected.[^gpspatron]
Event ORB-2025-02 (2025-06-01): Russia formally acknowledged conducting deliberate jamming operations affecting civilian GNSS receivers in the Baltic Sea, stating operations would continue due to military requirements. This acknowledgement fundamentally changes the deterrence calculus: jamming that was previously attributable but unconfirmed is now confirmed state policy.[^acw-traficom-eurocontrol]
The GPSPATRON cumulative analysis documents expansion from two regional hotspots in 2022 to five major active interference zones as of 2025: Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea/Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf.[^gpspatron]
GLONASS constellation deterioration (event ORB-2022-02) compounds the signal environment risk. Western sanctions cut Russia's access to radiation-hardened electronics constituting up to 90% of GLONASS-K components; satellites remain in flight test years post-launch; existing operational satellites operate beyond warranted design lifetimes. Russia's integration of Chinese components via the BeiDou–GLONASS interoperability agreement creates a geopolitical dependency cluster with implications for the global geodesy supply chain's multi-source redundancy principle. The effective emergence of a two-constellation GNSS environment (GPS + BeiDou) concentrates strategic influence in two sovereign actors.[^gpsworld-glonass-jamestown-ru]
3.2 International Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF)
Workflow Reference: ITRF Workflow (Work Assignment 2 Annex, v3.5)
Overall domain classification: HIGH — Tier 3 at 13.75 / High
| Tier | Description | PPTD Gap | Step Criticality | Tier Risk Score | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 0 | Multi-Technique Observation (VLBI, SLR, GNSS, DORIS) | 2.07 | 3 | 6.21 | Minor |
| Tier 1 | Technique-Specific Data Centres (IVS DC, ILRS DC, IGS DC, IDS DC) | 3.00 | 4 | 12.00 | Significant |
| Tier 2 | Analysis Centres (VLBI, SLR, GNSS, DORIS ACs) | 2.13 | 4 | 8.50 | Significant |
| Tier 3 | ITRS Product Centre at IGN (Combination + ITRF computation) | 2.75 | 5 | 13.75 | High |
| Tier 4 | Product Distribution (IERS, geodesy.science, national geodetic agencies) | 2.50 | 2 | 5.00 | Minor |
(UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment, 2026)
ITRS Product Centre at IGN — SPOF (Tier 3, Score 13.75 / High).
The ITRS Product Centre, operated by the Institut National de l'Information Géographique et Forestière (IGN) in Paris, is the single institution responsible for computing the International Terrestrial Reference System realisation — the ITRF. While multiple analysis centres contribute technique-specific solutions, only the ITRS Product Centre performs the final combination that produces the ITRF. This is a structural single point of failure in the ITRF workflow. The WA4 architecture must address jurisdictional redundancy for this function.
Event ITRF-2022-01 (positive development): ITRF2020 released April 2022, the eighth ITRF realisation since 1994 and the most accurate to date. WGS 84 was aligned to ITRF2020 by the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in January 2024, with the GPS control segment updated 4 March 2024.[^ion] The current accuracy of approximately 1–2 mm per year has not yet achieved the 0.1 mm per year long-term stability goal required for ice sheet and sea level science.
Event ITRF-2025-01 (High concern): DOGE arrived at NASA in February 2025. The NASA Space Geodesy Program (NASA Space Geodesy Network, Global GNSS Network, and CDDIS data archive) faces budget uncertainty. Workforce reductions threaten continuity of collocated stations. A draft Environmental Impact Statement for real-estate agreements at the Kokee Park Geophysical Observatory (KPGO) in Hawaii (June 2025) signals that the operational tenure of this critical co-located VLBI/SLR/GNSS site is under active review. No replacement mechanism exists for NASA's station portfolio.[^science-nasa-sgp-bloomberg]
The ILRS simulation study presented at EGU 2025 quantified this structurally: loss of relatively few SLR stations causes significant degradation of the combined global terrestrial reference frame.[^egu-ilrs]
Event ITRF-2024-01 (positive development): ESA GENESIS mission confirmed — a co-location satellite carrying VLBI, SLR, GNSS, and DORIS instruments in a single orbit, specifically designed to resolve systematic ITRF origin and scale errors that ground co-location cannot.[^genesis]
WA1 principle gaps: Principle 2 (single jurisdiction — ITRS Product Centre at IGN); Principle 2 (NASA Space Geodesy — single national programme without continuity plan); Principle 5 (Network Operations Technology maturity sub-score of 1.0 across archiving tier).
3.3 Earth Orientation Parameters (EOP)
Workflow Reference: EOP Workflow (Work Assignment 2 Annex, v3.5)
Overall domain classification: SIGNIFICANT — Tier 3 at 12.75, Tier 1 at 12.00; no tier reaches the High band, but governance-track findings elevate urgency (see below)
| Tier | Description | PPTD Gap | Step Criticality | Tier Risk Score | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 0 | Multi-Technique Observation (VLBI, GNSS, SLR, DORIS, Optical) | 1.92 | 4 | 7.67 | Significant |
| Tier 1 | Data Archiving and Correlation (IVS Data Centres, CDDIS) | 3.00 | 4 | 12.00 | Significant |
| Tier 2 | Analysis Centres (IVS ACs, IGS ACs, ILRS ACs, IERS constituents) | 2.69 | 4 | 10.75 | Significant |
| Tier 3 | IERS Combination and Product Generation (USNO / CB Paris Observatory) | 3.19 | 4 | 12.75 | Significant |
| Tier 4 | Product Distribution (IERS Bulletins A, B, C, D) | 3.38 | 2 | 6.75 | Minor |
(UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment, 2026)
EOP's highest risk tier is Tier 3 (EOP combination and product generation, score 12.75), sitting just below the High band. The USNO Rapid Service operates on a best-effort basis with no formal SLA and is directly exposed to U.S. federal appropriations risk — governance-track gaps against Principles 3 and 6 whose profile mirrors that of the top-ranked tiers in this assessment. Tier 1 (data archiving and VLBI correlation, score 12.00) is a closely ranked second, driven by a Network Operations Technology sub-score of 1.0 — the systemic archiving/correlation gap described in §4.1. This reflects the findings of the longitudinal review of IGS Technical Reports (2013, 2018) conducted during Phase 1: widespread failure by major analysis centres and data centres to submit annual reports signals a critical gap in global network monitoring that blinds the supply chain to creeping degradation. (State of Geodesy 2026)
UT1-UTC — the critical EOP sub-product. UT1-UTC is dynamically variable, unpredictable, and uniquely dependent on continuous VLBI observations. No other space geodetic technique can independently determine UT1-UTC with the required precision. A sustained interruption to the global VLBI network would degrade UT1-UTC within weeks and begin affecting satellite operations within months.
Event EOP-2022-01 (High concern): The Institute of Applied Astronomy (IAA) in St Petersburg contributed both a VLBI analysis centre and correlator to the IVS network. Post-February 2022, sanctions and Russia's increasing isolation from international geodetic bodies created uncertainty about data access and continued participation.[^ivs-ar] There is no institutional mechanism to negotiate or enforce continued access.
VGOS (VLBI Global Observing System), the next-generation geodetic VLBI network designed to improve UT1-UTC latency and accuracy, remains geographically incomplete. Significant coverage gaps persist in Africa and parts of Asia, limiting uniform global baseline coverage required for UT1-UTC at full specification accuracy.
Solar Cycle 25 (event STR-2024-02): The cycle exceeded its 2020 NOAA/NASA forecast, with elevated ionospheric disturbance degrading VLBI delay measurements, GNSS positioning, and DORIS tracking — all Tier 0 inputs to EOP processing — simultaneously in 2024–2025. This is the correlated multi-technique degradation scenario that the global geodesy supply chain's multi-technique combination is designed to mitigate but cannot fully compensate when all techniques are affected simultaneously.[^noaa-swpc]
WA1 principle gaps: Principle 1 (geographic — VGOS incomplete in southern hemisphere and Africa); Principle 2 (IAA data access — no formal mechanism for geopolitically sensitive territory contributions); Principle 3 and Principle 6 (USNO Rapid Service — no formal SLA, no independent monitoring); Principle 5 (Network Operations maturity 2.00, archiving Technology sub-score 1.0).
3.4 International Celestial Reference Frame (ICRF)
Workflow Reference: ICRF Workflow (Work Assignment 2 Annex, v3.5)
Overall domain classification: HIGH — Tier 1 (IVS Correlators) at 15.00 / High
| Tier | Description | PPTD Gap | Step Criticality | Tier Risk Score | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 0 | VLBI Observation Network (IVS stations, VGOS network) | 2.33 | 5 | 11.67 | Significant |
| Tier 1 | IVS Correlators (Bonn, Haystack, Vienna, Shanghai, Tsukuba) | 3.00 | 5 | 15.00 | High |
| Tier 2 | VLBI Analysis Centres (IVS ACs) | 3.31 | 3 | 9.94 | Significant |
| Tier 3 | ICRF Product Centre (IERS/IVS combination) | 2.08 | 4 | 8.33 | Significant |
| Tier 4 | Product Distribution (IERS catalogue, geodesy.science) | 2.33 | 1 | 2.33 | Minor |
(UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment, 2026)
IVS Correlators — SPOF (Tier 1, Score 15.00 / High).
The ICRF workflow registers the highest single-tier score outside Satellite Orbits Tier 3. The IVS correlator tier — comprising a small number of facilities at Bonn, Haystack, Vienna, Shanghai, and Tsukuba — carries a PPTD Gap of 3.00 and a Step Criticality of 5, reflecting the absence of alternative processing pathways for raw VLBI data. Raw VLBI data cannot be analysed without a correlator that specialises in geodetic VLBI; these facilities cannot be rapidly replicated. The loss of one or two correlators would create a material reduction in ICRF maintenance capacity with no substitute available on any near-term timescale. Tier 0 (score 11.67, Significant) also carries a Step Criticality of 5 — the single-technique VLBI dependency and sparse southern hemisphere network mean the observation layer shares the correlators' single-point-of-failure structure even though its capability maturity is somewhat stronger.
The ICRF itself (currently ICRF3) is stable and does not require continuous operational updating in the same way as EOP. However, ICRF maintenance relies on the same VLBI network and correlator infrastructure that supports UT1-UTC. The long-term ICRF programme is therefore implicitly coupled to all the risks facing EOP's Tier 0 and Tier 1 identified above.
Event ICRF-2025-01 (Medium concern): The IVS filed for a WRC-2031 agenda item to protect radio frequency bands essential to geodetic VLBI from commercial and military spectrum encroachment. The six-year horizon of that protection process, against rapidly expanding commercial spectrum use and active electronic warfare operations, represents a meaningful medium-term risk to VLBI observation quality.[^ivs-flyer]
The IAA St Petersburg situation (event EOP-2022-01) applies equally here: IAA participated in IVS correlator operations and ICRF maintenance sessions. Its post-2022 status cannot be assumed to continue. Russia's increasing isolation from international geodetic bodies is documented in GPS World and IAG communications.[^ivs-ar]
WA1 principle gaps: Principle 2 (no mechanism for geopolitically sensitive territory contributions); Principle 3 (IVS correlators operated as academic best-effort, no SLA); Principle 4 (WRC-2031 frequency protection not secured).
3.5 Global Gravity Model
Workflow Reference: Global Gravity Model Workflow (Work Assignment 2 Annex, v3.3)
Overall domain classification: SIGNIFICANT — Tier 2 at 12.00, Tier 3 at 11.50; no tier reaches the High band
| Tier | Description | PPTD Gap | Step Criticality | Tier Risk Score | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 0 | Satellite Gravimetry Acquisition (GRACE-FO, SLR, CHAMP legacy) | 2.25 | 4 | 9.00 | Significant |
| Tier 1 | Data Archiving (ISDC, CDDIS, NASA PODAAC, JPL ECHO) | 2.75 | 2 | 5.50 | Minor |
| Tier 2 | Processing Centres (CSR, GFZ, JPL, AIUB, ITSG) | 3.00 | 4 | 12.00 | Significant |
| Tier 3 | COST-G Combination (combination of monthly solutions) | 2.88 | 4 | 11.50 | Significant |
| Tier 4 | Product Distribution (ICGEM, GRACE portal) | 2.50 | 2 | 5.00 | Minor |
(UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment, 2026)
Event GGM-2025-01 (High concern): GRACE-FO (NASA/DLR joint mission, launched May 2018) continues operations seven years into a planned five-year design lifetime, but has no confirmed funded successor. The 2017–2018 gap between the end of the original GRACE mission (October 2017) and launch of GRACE-FO (May 2018) — 11 months — required interpolation and degraded the continuity of global mass change records. That gap arose because no funding existed to prevent it. DOGE-related NASA budget pressure (2025) increases the risk that a GRACE-C successor programme will not receive timely funding. A gap of 12–24 months would degrade ice sheet mass balance records, introduce systematic error into the geoid, and compromise long-period climate attribution studies that depend on unbroken mass change time series going back to 2002.[^grace-pmc]
The gravity processing environment (Tiers 2 and 3) is institutionally well-structured: multiple independent processing centres (CSR, GFZ, JPL, AIUB, ITSG) produce monthly solutions, and the COST-G combination product provides a community-recommended international standard. The tier scores nonetheless place Tiers 2 and 3 as the highest-risk in the domain because the underlying constraint is human capital, not institutional structure: the Training and Education capability (avg 1.70 — Phase 1 Priority) and Knowledge Management capability (avg 1.30) create a structural succession risk in the small global pool of professionals capable of producing next-generation ultra-high-degree gravity models. The Gravity Data Acquisition and Storage capability itself scores comparatively well (People=2, Process=4, Technology=4, Data=3, Avg=3.30, re-verified against the published State of Geodesy 2026) — the acquisition-tier risk is mission continuity, not capability maturity, with the People dimension (2.0) the weakest element. (State of Geodesy 2026)
WA1 principle gaps: Principle 2 and Principle 4 (single NASA/DLR mission with no confirmed successor and no multilateral continuity commitment); Principle 5 (Training and Education at 1.70 and Knowledge Management at 1.30 — both below Minimum Viable Maturity for critical-path functions); Principle 3 and Principle 6 (geoid development concentration at NGA, GFZ, TU Munich inadequately documented, with no governing agreement).
4. Cross-Domain Gap Analysis
4.1 Systemic Capability Gaps
Analysis of the 58 capabilities scored in the published State of Geodesy 2026[^sog2026] reveals two categories of systemic gap. (State of Geodesy 2026)
Category A — Governance and Financing (uniformly scored 1.00): the most urgent systemic failure.
Nine capabilities — concentrated in the Governance and Strategy domain — are scored at 1.00, the minimum observed value. This is not individual institutional underperformance; it is the absence of functioning capability at the supply chain system level:
| Capability | Domain | Avg Score |
|---|---|---|
| Budgeting | Governance and Strategy | 1.00 |
| Cost Management | Governance and Strategy | 1.00 |
| Funding and Investment | Governance and Strategy | 1.00 |
| Mandate | Governance and Strategy | 1.00 |
| Policy Formulation | Governance and Strategy | 1.00 |
| Risk Management | Governance and Strategy | 1.00 |
| Strategic Planning | Governance and Strategy | 1.00 |
| Innovation Strategy Development | Innovation and Development | 1.00 |
| Model of the Global Geodesy Supply Chain | Asset and Infrastructure Management | 1.00 |
(State of Geodesy 2026)
The Governance and Strategy domain has the lowest average of any domain: 1.76 across 14 capabilities. The Innovation and Development domain averages 2.11. These are systemic-level scores, not scores for individual observatories or centres. They confirm that the supply chain lacks the institutional machinery to manage itself as a system.
Category B — Network Operations Technology sub-score of 1.0: the most widespread operational gap.
The Network Operations capability (scored People=2.0, Process=2.0, Technology=1.0, Data=3.0, Avg=2.00) carries a Technology sub-score of 1.0, reflecting the complete absence of automated global network monitoring tooling at the supply chain system level. This capability appears in the archiving tier of four of the five workflows — Satellite Orbits Tier 1 (score 10.80), ITRF Tier 1 (score 12.00), EOP Tier 1 (score 12.00), and ICRF Tier 1 (score 15.00) — making it the most widespread single operational gap in the supply chain. Satellite Orbits Tier 1 and ITRF Tier 1 both carry a Step Criticality of 4 (raised from 3 in this revision): the CDDIS/IGN/SIO equalization protocol is architecturally real but has no documented test or use during any of the three known CDDIS-affecting disruptions, and BKG has separately reported having no disaster-recovery capability of its own. The longitudinal analysis of IGS Technical Reports documented in the Phase 1 assessment confirms that the supply chain is systematically blind to its own network degradation. (State of Geodesy 2026)
Additional capabilities at or below the 2.00 average threshold that warrant direct attention include: Knowledge Management (1.30), Outreach and Public Awareness (1.30), Research and Development Planning (1.50), Disaster Recovery and Supply Chain Continuity (1.70), Training and Education (1.70), Technology Scouting (1.80), Data Preservation (2.00), Data Quality Management (2.00), Data Distribution (2.00), Geodetic Services (2.00), Geodetic Software and Tools (2.00), and Local Tie Processing and Analysis (2.00). All are drawn from the published State of Geodesy 2026.[^sog2026]
4.2 Single Points of Failure
Three single points of failure are confirmed with scores from the UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment (2026):
| SPOF | Workflow | Tier | Tier Risk Score | Classification | WA1 Principle Gaps |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACC/SPOCC Combination Engine (JPL/IGS CB) | Satellite Orbits | Tier 3 | 18.25 | High | P2, P3, P4, P6 |
| IVS Correlators (Bonn, Haystack, Vienna, Shanghai, Tsukuba) | ICRF | Tier 1 | 15.00 | High | P2, P3, P4 |
| ITRS Product Centre at IGN | ITRF | Tier 3 | 13.75 | High | P2, P3 |
(UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment, 2026)
These three tiers are precisely the only three in the assessment to reach the High classification, and all three carry a Step Criticality of 5. All three SPOFs share a structural characteristic: the combination or correlation function at their tier has no operationally ready backup. Alternative approaches may exist in theory (other software, other institutions), but no tested, geopolitically distributed, operationally ready failover pathway has been demonstrated. WA1 Principle 2 requires that redundant capacity in geopolitically distinct jurisdictions be demonstrated to be operationally ready — not merely planned — before any single-jurisdiction dependency can be considered resolved.
4.3 Key Person Dependencies
The WA2 workflow analysis formally documents key person risk at the Analysis Centre layer of the Satellite Orbits workflow: while software diversity across Analysis Centres (Bernese, GipsyX, NAPEOS, PANDA, EPOS.P8) provides algorithmic resilience at Tier 2, each software package carries a High key-person maintenance risk due to reliance on niche academic teams. This is compounded by the workforce decline documented in the State of Geodesy 2026: reduced training pathways, low public visibility of geodesy as a profession, and the retirement of cohorts trained during the expansion of space geodesy in the 1990s and 2000s.[^sog2026]
The Geodetic Software and Tools capability is scored at 2.00 (People=2, Process=3, Technology=1, Data=2) — the Technology sub-score of 1.0 indicating that software tooling itself is in need of systematic modernisation and that no funded lifecycle management exists at the supply chain level. (State of Geodesy 2026)
5. Investment Prioritisation
5.1 Priority Ranking Table
Priorities are ranked by Tier Risk Score (where available) and classified by structural category. All scores are drawn from the UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment (2026).
| Priority | Gap | Domain | Tier Risk Score | Classification | WA1 Principle |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ACC/SPOCC: Establish geographically distributed backup combination engine | Satellite Orbits | 18.25 | High (urgent — all four governance-track principles unmet) | P2, P3, P4, P6 |
| 2 | IVS Correlators: Establish SLA-governed redundant correlator capacity in geopolitically diverse institutions | ICRF | 15.00 | High | P2, P3 |
| 3 | ITRS Product Centre: Establish jurisdictional redundancy for ITRF combination | ITRF | 13.75 | High | P2 |
| 4 | EOP Combination: Formalise SLA and independent monitoring for the USNO Rapid Service / IERS combination function | EOP | 12.75 | Significant | P3, P6 |
| 5 | EOP/ITRF Tier 1 Archiving: Test and formalise the CDDIS/IGN/SIO failover pathway (no documented test or use exists across three known disruptions; BKG has no disaster-recovery capability of its own); deploy global network monitoring tooling to close the Network Operations Technology gap | EOP, ITRF | 12.00 / 12.00 | Significant | P4, P5, P6 |
| 6 | Gravity Processing: Address geoid-development succession risk; commit to GRACE-C multi-national funding before GRACE-FO lifetime is exhausted | Gravity | 12.00 / 11.50 | Significant | P5, P2 |
| 7 | ICRF Tier 0 VLBI Network: Expand VGOS network in Africa and Asia | ICRF | 11.67 | Significant | P1 |
| 8 | Satellite Orbits Tier 1 Archiving: Test and formalise the CDDIS/IGN/SIO failover pathway; address Network Operations Technology gap | Satellite Orbits | 10.80 | Significant | P4, P6 |
| 9 | Governance: Establish governance body with mandate, member state obligations, and operational resources | All | 1.00 (capability avg) | Systemic (governance track) | P3 |
| 10 | Financing: Establish GGSC funding compact proportionate to dependent revenue | All | 1.00 (capability avg) | Systemic (governance track) | P3 |
| 11 | NASA Space Geodesy continuity: Develop a formal continuity protocol independent of single national budget | ITRF, Gravity | ITRF-T3: 13.75 | High | P2 |
| 12 | GNSS jamming deterrence: Pursue multilateral deterrence framework for GNSS interference as attack on civil infrastructure | Satellite Orbits | ORB-2025-02 (state-acknowledged) | Systemic (event-based) | P2 |
5.2 Threshold Classification
The risk classification thresholds applied throughout this report are those of the Investment Prioritization and Risk Rubric (Work Assignment 1b, v3.1):
| Band | Tier Risk Score Range | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | ≥ 20 | Immediate systemic threat; block investment decisions pending resolution; product delivery at imminent risk |
| High | 13–19.99 | Significant risk with near-term consequences if unaddressed; near-term investment required |
| Significant | 7–12.99 | Notable risk with manageable near-term impact; programme-level monitoring and medium-term investment |
| Minor | 0–6.99 | Low risk; log to telemetry; no immediate action required |
No tier in the current assessment reaches the Critical band (≥ 20). Satellite Orbits Tier 3 at 18.25 is the closest and leads the ranking by a clear margin. The numeric bands must be read together with the governance track: under the rubric, a High operational score combined with Principle 2 or Principle 3 gaps at a critical-path function is treated as urgent — Satellite Orbits Tier 3, with gaps against all four governance-track principles, is the canonical case. The governance and financing capability averages (1.00) are systemic-level findings assessed on the governance track rather than tier risks; they are presented as such in §5.1.
5.3 Recommended Interventions
Immediate (0–12 months):
ACC/SPOCC backup pathway. Commission a formally governed, institutionally diverse, geographically distributed backup Analysis Center Coordinator and SPOCC combination engine outside the United States. Execute a tested failover exercise within the commission period.
Network Operations monitoring tooling. Fund and deploy automated global network monitoring capability as a UN-GGCE infrastructure service, addressing the Technology sub-score of 1.0 that appears across all five product domain archiving tiers.
IVS correlator SLA framework. Negotiate formal service level agreements with existing IVS correlator facilities; commission scoping for at least one additional geopolitically diverse correlator facility with full training and data access.
Near-term (12–36 months):
ITRS Product Centre jurisdictional redundancy. Develop a tested backup ITRF combination capability in at least one institution in a jurisdiction geopolitically independent of France, with proven software parity and tested data exchange.
VGOS expansion. Prioritise capital investment for at least two VGOS-compatible observatory sites in East Africa and South-East Asia, addressing the most critical VLBI coverage gaps for both ICRF and EOP.
Governance compact. Use the 1st Joint Development Plan implementation process to establish a formal governance council with member state obligations, moving the UN-GGCE toward an accountability body with operational authority. Mandate, Policy Formulation, Strategic Planning, and Risk Management are each at 1.00 — the governance vacuum is the root cause enabling every other risk.
Medium-term (36–60 months):
GRACE-C mission funding. Secure a multi-nation funding commitment for a GRACE-C or equivalent mission before GRACE-FO's operational lifetime is exhausted. Establish the commitment no later than 2027 to allow adequate development lead time.
Bilateral data access agreements. Develop scientific data-sharing protocols for geodetic data from stations in geopolitically sensitive territories, insulated from general diplomatic relations.
GNSS deterrence framework. Advocate for the designation of GNSS integrity as critical global infrastructure under applicable international law, establishing a legal basis for attributable interference to be treated as an attack on shared civil systems.
WRC-2031 coordination. Support the IVS WRC-2031 agenda item and coordinate member state ITU delegations to carry a unified position on geodetic VLBI frequency protection.
6. Geopolitical and Event-Based Risk
This section draws exclusively from events documented with verifiable source URLs and cross-referenced against primary institutional records. All events cited are drawn from the WA3 event record; no events are asserted beyond what the verified source documentation supports.
Russia (actor in: ORB-2022-01, ORB-2022-02, ORB-2024-01, ORB-2025-02, EOP-2022-01)
Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered a permanent restructuring of the global geodesy supply chain geopolitical risk environment. Five categories of direct impact are documented:
- Deliberate, sustained, and state-acknowledged GNSS jamming affecting Baltic, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Arctic regions (ORB-2022-01, ORB-2025-02)
- Destruction of GLONASS constellation viability through sanctions-driven component access loss (ORB-2022-02)
- Disruption of IAA St Petersburg VLBI analysis and correlator contributions to EOP and ICRF maintenance (EOP-2022-01)
- Mass GNSS disruption events in Eastern Europe: March 2024, 1,600+ aircraft (ORB-2024-01)[^gpsworld-jam]
- Formal acknowledgement of deliberate Baltic Sea civilian jamming as state policy (ORB-2025-02)[^acw-traficom-eurocontrol]
United States (actor in: ITRF-2025-01)
The DOGE NASA review commenced February 2025. NASA Space Geodesy Program (NSGN, GGN, CDDIS) faces budget uncertainty and workforce reductions. The Kokee Park Geophysical Observatory (KPGO) in Hawaii is under real-estate review (June 2025 Environmental Impact Statement).[^science-nasa-sgp-bloomberg] The critical risk is not deliberate withdrawal but gradual, unannounced degradation invisible within a best-effort contribution model until a product quality threshold is crossed.
Iran and regional actors (actor in: ORB-2025-01)
In June 2025, over 3,000 vessels were disrupted in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz within less than two weeks, linked to Iran–Israel conflict escalation and regional electronic warfare operations. This is the largest single maritime GNSS disruption event on record.[^gpspatron] The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden were simultaneously affected by the Yemen conflict environment.
China (actor in: ORB-2023-02, ORB-2024-05, EOP/ITRF secondary context)
ICAO recognised BeiDou for global civil aviation in November 2023 (ORB-2023-02)[^spacenews]. China's BeiDou 2035 Development Plan (ORB-2024-05, published November 2024) targets next-generation constellation deployment by 2029 and full operational capability by 2035, with real-time accuracy targets significantly exceeding current civilian GPS performance.[^spacenews] China also operates VLBI and SLR stations contributing to ITRF and ICRF. These stations remain accessible but are subject to the same geopolitical risk dynamics that constrain broader scientific cooperation in periods of heightened tension.
International bodies (actor in: STR-2023-01, STR-2024-01, STR-2024-03)
Three positive governance developments are recorded in the institutional event record. The UN-GGCE was formally established at UN Campus Bonn in March 2023 (STR-2023-01)[^unggce-web]. The Hidden Risk Report was published June 2024 (STR-2024-01)[^hidden-risk]. The 1st Joint Development Plan for Global Geodesy was published August 2024 (STR-2024-03)[^jdp]. These represent the first coordinated strategic framework for the global geodesy supply chain and the implementation vehicle for the recommendations of this report.
7. Conclusion
The Global Geodesy Supply Chain faces three distinct but compounding risk categories in 2026: a structural governance and financing vacuum that has persisted for decades; acute single points of failure at the product combination tier of every major EGV workflow; and an increasingly hostile geopolitical environment in which supply chain inputs are under deliberate, acknowledged, state-sponsored attack.
The two-track risk framework applied in this report, drawing on the 58 capability maturity scores published in the State of Geodesy 2026[^sog2026] and the 25 workflow tier assessments of the UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment (2026), produces a consistent picture: the combination and archiving tiers — where raw observations are transformed into authoritative global products — are systematically under-resourced, poorly governed, and geographically concentrated. The worst single case, the ACC/SPOCC combination engine for Satellite Orbits, carries a Tier Risk Score of 18.25 — the highest of all 25 assessed tiers, with governance gaps against all four governance-track principles — and has already caused documented operational disruptions during U.S. government shutdowns. It is not a future risk; it is a known vulnerability that the community has been managing by luck and continuity of domestic politics.
The supply chain's remarkable resilience to date reflects the dedication and expertise of the scientific community that operates it. It does not reflect structural robustness. The UN-GGCE's establishment in 2023 and the publication of the 1st Joint Development Plan in 2024 provide the institutional foundation for transition from crisis improvisation to supply chain management. The interventions identified in §5.3 provide a sequenced investment path. The most important is also the most straightforward: establish the governance compact that gives the UN-GGCE — or a body formally constituted under it — the mandate, authority, and resources to manage the supply chain as a system.
Appendix A: Capability Maturity Reference
Bottom-12 capabilities by average maturity score, drawn from the published State of Geodesy 2026[^sog2026] (58 capabilities, verified 15 June 2026). Dimension scores shown as published; where the State of Geodesy 2026 records a dimension as Not Applicable it is shown as —.
(State of Geodesy 2026)
| Rank | Capability | Domain | People | Process | Technology | Data | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1= | Budgeting | Governance and Strategy | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.00 |
| 1= | Cost Management | Governance and Strategy | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.00 |
| 1= | Funding and Investment | Governance and Strategy | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.00 |
| 1= | Innovation Strategy Development | Innovation and Development | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.00 |
| 1= | Mandate | Governance and Strategy | 1.0 | 1.0 | — | — | 1.00 |
| 1= | Model of the Global Geodesy Supply Chain | Asset and Infrastructure Management | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.00 |
| 1= | Policy Formulation | Governance and Strategy | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.00 |
| 1= | Risk Management | Governance and Strategy | 1.0 | 1.0 | — | — | 1.00 |
| 1= | Strategic Planning | Governance and Strategy | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.00 |
| 10= | Knowledge Management | Innovation and Development | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.30 |
| 10= | Outreach and Public Awareness | Engagement and Collaboration | 1.0 | 1.0 | — | 2.0 | 1.30 |
| 12 | Research and Development Planning | Innovation and Development | 2.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 1.50 |
Capability domain averages (all 58 capabilities):
| Domain | Capabilities | Average Score |
|---|---|---|
| Governance and Strategy | 14 | 1.76 |
| Innovation and Development | 9 | 2.11 |
| Engagement and Collaboration | 6 | 2.13 |
| Asset and Infrastructure Management | 5 | 2.26 |
| Data Products and Software | 5 | 2.30 |
| Data Management | 19 | 2.75 |
Appendix B: Data Sources and Methodology
The quantitative scores presented in this report — capability maturity scores and tier risk scores — rest on two authoritative sources:
State of Geodesy 2026 capability maturity baseline. The People, Process, Technology, Data (PPTD) capability maturity framework was developed during the first UN-GGCE consultancy engagement (Terms of Reference 1) and applied at full scale in the State of Geodesy 2026: A baseline maturity assessment (UN-GGCE, 16 March 2026)[^sog2026], which evaluated fifty-eight operational capabilities across the four PPTD dimensions on a 1–5 maturity scale. All capability maturity scores in this report are drawn from the published report (tables pp. 44–71), cross-referenced against IGS Technical Reports (2013, 2018), IVS Annual Reports, ILRS Annual Reports, and primary IAG/GGOS publications. All 58 scores were verified against the published State of Geodesy 2026 on 15 June 2026, and have been calculated and stored in a database maintained for this engagement.
UN-GGCE Supply Chain Risk Assessment (2026). Twenty-five workflow tier risk scores were computed by applying the operational track of the two-track Investment Prioritization and Risk Rubric (Work Assignment 1b, v3.1) to the capability maturity baseline in a scoring run dated 22 June 2026, calculated and stored in a database maintained for this engagement. Each tier's PPTD Gap was computed from the capabilities mapped to that tier in the five Work Assignment 2 workflow description documents. Step Criticality values were assigned through architectural analysis of the product delivery chain topology for each EGV domain, as documented in the five Work Assignment 2 Annexes:
- Satellite Orbits Workflow (v5.5)
- ITRF Workflow (v3.5)
- EOP Workflow (v3.5)
- ICRF Workflow (v3.5)
- Global Gravity Model Workflow (v3.3)
Event records. The geopolitical and operational events cited in §3 and §6 are each supported by a verifiable primary source URL listed at the point of citation and consolidated in Appendix C. No event is asserted without a primary institutional, governmental, or peer-reviewed source.
External authoritative sources. The following institutional documents provide the authoritative policy, operational, and scientific context for all claims in this report:
| Source | URL |
|---|---|
| State of Geodesy 2026 (UN-GGCE) | https://www.un.org/globalgeospatial/sites/default/files/2026-05/stateofgeodesy.pdf |
| UN-GGCE Hidden Risk Report v1.1 | https://ggim.un.org/UNGGCE/documents/20240620-Hidden_Risk_Report.pdf |
| 1st Joint Development Plan for Global Geodesy | https://ggim.un.org/UNGGCE/documents/Version_1.0_1st_Joint_Development_Plan_for_Global_Geodesy_EN.pdf |
| IGS 2018 Technical Report | https://files.igs.org/pub/resource/technical_reports/2018_techreport.pdf |
| IVS 2021–2022 Annual Report (NASA/TP) | https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20230014975/downloads/NASA-TP-20230014975%202021-2022%20BR%20Dirk%2010-19-23.pdf |
| IAG/GGOS EGV White Paper V7.0 (January 2026) | IAG/GGOS, January 2026 |
Appendix C: Source References
| Source | URL | Date |
|---|---|---|
| UN-GGCE Hidden Risk Report v1.1 | https://ggim.un.org/UNGGCE/documents/20240620-Hidden_Risk_Report.pdf | June 2024 |
| State of Geodesy 2026 (UN-GGCE) | https://www.un.org/globalgeospatial/sites/default/files/2026-05/stateofgeodesy.pdf | March 2026 |
| UN-GGCE 1st Joint Development Plan for Global Geodesy | https://ggim.un.org/UNGGCE/documents/Version_1.0_1st_Joint_Development_Plan_for_Global_Geodesy_EN.pdf | August 2024 |
| UN-GGCE website | https://ggim.un.org/UNGGCE/ | 2024–2026 |
| EASA SIB 2022-02R3 — GNSS Outages and Alterations | https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/air-operations/global-navigation-satellite-system-outages-and-alterations | July 2024 |
| IATA GNSS Safety Risk Assessment V5 | https://ic.iata.org/sites/default/files/iata_sih_document_attachment/IATA%20Safety%20Risk%20Assessment%20-%20GNSS%20Interference%20V5.pdf | 2025 |
| GPSPATRON Maritime GNSS Interference Analysis (Cumulative 2025) | https://gpspatron.com/maritime-gnss-interference-worldwide-a-cumulative-analysis-2025/ | October 2025 |
| GPS World — GLONASS Deterioration | https://www.gpsworld.com/tough-times-for-russian-navigation-system/ | November 2025 |
| GPS World — GPS Jamming in Geopolitical Conflict Regions | https://www.gpsworld.com/innovation-recent-gps-jamming-in-regions-of-geopolitical-conflict/ | 2024 |
| Jamestown — Russian Satellite Constellation Deterioration | https://jamestown.org/russias-satellite-constellation-deteriorates-increasing-dependency-on-china/ | July 2025 |
| Jamestown — BeiDou Strategic Advances | https://jamestown.org/beidou-and-strategic-advancements-in-prc-space-navigation/ | July 2025 |
| SpaceNews — BeiDou 2035 Plan | https://spacenews.com/china-to-launch-next-generation-beidou-satellites-in-2027/ | November 2024 |
| Air Cargo Week — GNSS Interference and Aviation | https://aircargoweek.com/gnss-interference-sparks-concerns-in-the-aviation-sector/ | December 2025 |
| AVIATIONREGWATCH — GNSS Interference | https://aviationregwatch.com/gnss-interference-aviation/ | 2025 |
| Finland Traficom — GNSS Interference Notices | https://www.traficom.fi/en/ | 2024–2025 |
| EUROCONTROL — GNSS Interference Reporting | https://www.eurocontrol.int/gnss | 2024–2025 |
| NAVIGATION/ION — WGS 84 and ITRF2020 Alignment | https://navi.ion.org/content/72/2/navi.693 | May 2025 |
| ESA GENESIS Mission (GPS World) | https://editions.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?i=827417&article_id=4823256 | August 2024 |
| EGU 2025 — ILRS Fragility Simulation | https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2025EGUGA..2719633R/abstract | 2025 |
| NOAA SWPC — Solar Cycle 25 Revised Forecast | https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/news/noaa-forecasts-quicker-stronger-peak-solar-activity | 2023 |
| NASA Science Blog — Solar Cycle 25 Exceeding Predictions | https://science.nasa.gov/blogs/solar-cycle-25/2022/07/27/solar-cycle-25-is-exceeding-predictions-and-showing-why-we-need-the-gdc-mission/ | 2022 |
| Science/AAAS — DOGE Cuts at NASA | https://www.science.org/content/article/confusion-and-worry-doge-cuts-hit-nasa | March 2025 |
| NASA Space Geodesy Project | https://space-geodesy.nasa.gov/ | 2024–2025 |
| Bloomberg — NASA Recruiting after DOGE | https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/nasa-starts-recruiting-drive-after-musk-s-doge-thinned-agency | March 2026 |
| IVS 2021–2022 Annual Report (NASA Technical Report) | https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20230014975/downloads/NASA-TP-20230014975%202021-2022%20BR%20Dirk%2010-19-23.pdf | November 2023 |
| IVS Flyer — VLBI Frequency Protection (WRC-2031) | https://ivscc.gsfc.nasa.gov/stations/IVS_flyer_2025_final.pdf | 2025 |
| NCBI/PMC — GRACE-FO Applications and Challenges | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9050784/ | 2022 |
| GGCE Capacity Development Workshop (CNIG) | https://cnig.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/2024_ggce_geopos_20_mars_v2.pdf | 2024 |
[^hidden-risk]: United Nations Global Geodetic Centre of Excellence, 2024, Hidden Risk Report v1.1, https://ggim.un.org/UNGGCE/documents/20240620-Hidden_Risk_Report.pdf [^sog2026]: United Nations Global Geodetic Centre of Excellence, 2026, State of Geodesy 2026: A Baseline Maturity Assessment, https://www.un.org/globalgeospatial/sites/default/files/2026-05/stateofgeodesy.pdf [^igsmail-igs2018]: International GNSS Service, 2013, IGSMAIL-6826, https://lists.igs.org/pipermail/igsmail/2013/000660.html; International GNSS Service, IGS 2018 Technical Report, https://files.igs.org/pub/resource/technical_reports/2018_techreport.pdf [^easa-iata]: EASA, 2024, Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R3: GNSS Outages and Alterations, https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/air-operations/global-navigation-satellite-system-outages-and-alterations; IATA, 2025, GNSS Interference Safety Risk Assessment V5, https://ic.iata.org/sites/default/files/iata_sih_document_attachment/IATA Safety Risk Assessment - GNSS Interference V5.pdf [^gpsworld-jam]: GPS World, 2024, Innovation: Recent GPS Jamming in Regions of Geopolitical Conflict, https://www.gpsworld.com/innovation-recent-gps-jamming-in-regions-of-geopolitical-conflict/ [^gpspatron]: GPSPATRON, 2025, Maritime GNSS Interference Worldwide: A Cumulative Analysis, https://gpspatron.com/maritime-gnss-interference-worldwide-a-cumulative-analysis-2025/ [^iata-avregwatch]: IATA, 2025, GNSS Interference Safety Risk Assessment V5, https://ic.iata.org/sites/default/files/iata_sih_document_attachment/IATA Safety Risk Assessment - GNSS Interference V5.pdf; Aviation Reg Watch, 2025, GNSS Interference and Aviation, https://aviationregwatch.com/gnss-interference-aviation/ [^acw-traficom-eurocontrol]: Air Cargo Week, 2025, GNSS Interference Sparks Concerns in the Aviation Sector, https://aircargoweek.com/gnss-interference-sparks-concerns-in-the-aviation-sector/; Traficom (Finnish Transport and Communications Agency), GNSS interference notices, https://www.traficom.fi/en/; EUROCONTROL, GNSS interference reporting, https://www.eurocontrol.int/gnss [^gpsworld-glonass-jamestown-ru]: GPS World, 2025, Tough Times for Russian Navigation System, https://www.gpsworld.com/tough-times-for-russian-navigation-system/; Jamestown Foundation, 2025, Russia's Satellite Constellation Deteriorates, Increasing Dependency on China, https://jamestown.org/russias-satellite-constellation-deteriorates-increasing-dependency-on-china/ [^ion]: NAVIGATION: Journal of the Institute of Navigation, 2025, WGS 84 and ITRF2020 Alignment, https://navi.ion.org/content/72/2/navi.693 [^science-nasa-sgp-bloomberg]: Science (AAAS), 2025, DOGE Cuts Hit NASA, https://www.science.org/content/article/confusion-and-worry-doge-cuts-hit-nasa; NASA Space Geodesy Project, https://space-geodesy.nasa.gov/; Bloomberg, 2026, NASA Starts Recruiting Drive After DOGE Thinned Agency, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/nasa-starts-recruiting-drive-after-musk-s-doge-thinned-agency [^egu-ilrs]: EGU General Assembly 2025, ILRS Fragility Simulation, https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2025EGUGA..2719633R/abstract [^genesis]: GPS World, 2024, ESA GENESIS Mission, https://editions.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?i=827417&article_id=4823256 [^ivs-ar]: International VLBI Service, 2023, 2021--2022 Biennial Report (NASA/TP-20230014975), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20230014975/downloads/NASA-TP-20230014975 2021-2022 BR Dirk 10-19-23.pdf [^noaa-swpc]: NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center, 2023, NOAA Forecasts Quicker, Stronger Peak Solar Activity, https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/news/noaa-forecasts-quicker-stronger-peak-solar-activity [^ivs-flyer]: International VLBI Service, 2025, Geodetic VLBI Frequency Protection (WRC-2031), https://ivscc.gsfc.nasa.gov/stations/IVS_flyer_2025_final.pdf [^grace-pmc]: NCBI PMC, 2022, GRACE-FO Applications and Challenges, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9050784/ [^spacenews]: SpaceNews, 2024, China to Launch Next-Generation BeiDou Satellites in 2027, https://spacenews.com/china-to-launch-next-generation-beidou-satellites-in-2027/ [^unggce-web]: United Nations Global Geodetic Centre of Excellence website, https://ggim.un.org/UNGGCE/ [^jdp]: United Nations Global Geodetic Centre of Excellence, 2024, 1st Joint Development Plan for Global Geodesy, https://ggim.un.org/UNGGCE/documents/Version_1.0_1st_Joint_Development_Plan_for_Global_Geodesy_EN.pdf
Prepared by Ben Wortley — UN-GGCE ToR2 Consulting Engagementben@merchantsofmalta.com© 2026 Ben Wortley